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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today, thirteen percent of all United States employers offer benefits to the 
domestic partners of their employees.1  Larger companies, those with more than 
5,000 employees, the figure is twenty-five percent.2  Benefits offered to domestic 
                                                                
1John Hendren, Domestic-Partner Policies Increase in U.S. Companies Thirteen Percent 
Offer Benefits, Study Says, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), June 29, 1997, available in 1997 
WL 11959999; Christopher Calhoun, Wilson's Latest Anti-Gay Wedge Misses Board of 
Regents:  UC Employees Deserve What Major Businesses Already Concede:  Domestic 
Partner Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14002397; John Hendren, 
Southern Baptists' Boycott Bucks a Trend/Thirteen Percent of All U.S. Employers Offer Health 
Benefits to Partners of Gay Workers, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 30, 1997, available in 1997 
WL 7430509. 
2See sources cited supra note 1. 
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partners often include both hard and soft benefits.3  Hard benefits, which are 
commonly called "cost intensive benefits," may include medical, vision, and dental 
insurance along with pension or retirement benefits.4  Other benefits are referred to 
as soft benefits and may include bereavement leave, legal services, employee 
discounts, health and fitness programs, relocation policies, and child care.5 
The number of companies offering such benefits has increased dramatically in 
this decade.  Over the past three or four years, the number of public and private 
employers offering domestic partner benefits has increased from about 200 to over 
600 in 1997.6  Some of the reasons cited by employers for offering such benefits 
include employee recruitment and retention, and the employer's own non-
discrimination policy.7 
However, not every employer offering such benefits include both heterosexual 
and homosexual partners in their policy8 mainly because they believe heterosexuals 
can legally marry, whereas, homosexuals cannot.9  Domestic partner benefits can be 
defined in either narrow or broad terms.10  In the broad definition, employment 
benefits are given to all individuals regardless of their marital status or sexual 
orientation.11  On the other hand, the narrow definition extends benefits only to 
homosexuals and their partners who are legally prohibited from getting married.12  
                                                                
3Alice Rickel, Extending Employee Benefits to Domestic Partners:  Avoiding Legal 
Hurdles While Staying in Tune with the Changing Definition of the Family, 16 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 737, 737 (1995); John O. White, UCSD Staff Home Page, Domestic Partner Benefits 
Update (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/sa/partner.html>. 
4Id. 
5Id. 
6Assembly OKs Bill on Domestic-Partner Health Benefits, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 
3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3136863; Michael Bradford, Employers More at Ease with 
Partner Benefits:  Expert Michael Bradford, BUS. INS., Sept. 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 
8295421. 
7Julie Cohen Mason, Domestic Partner Benefits, MGMT. REV., Nov. 1, 1995, available in 
1995 WL 8081062; Sherry Boschert, Domestic Partner Benefits:  A Trend Toward Fairness, 
an Update for News Media Executives, Produced by the National Lesbian and Gay Journalists 
Association (1997) (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.nlgja.org/ 
programs/DP/DPtrend.html>; Human Rights Campaign, Domestic Partnership Benefits for 
Same-Sex Couples, Achieving Domestic Partnership Benefits and Why They Matter (visited 
Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplac/dp/index.html>; White, supra note 3. 
8Rickel, supra note 3, at 737. 
9Howard Pianko & Dean L. Silverberg, Domestic Partner Benefits on the Rise, What Are 
the Legal and Tax Issues?, 218 N.Y.L.J. 96 (1997) [hereinafter Pianko & Silverberg]. 
10Id. 
11Id. 
12Id. 
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Of the companies that offer benefits for unmarried employees' partners, about half 
exclude heterosexual couples.13 
Employers offering these benefits to same-sex domestic partners only, may face 
legal challenges such as marital status and sexual orientation discrimination or equal 
protection arguments14 from their unmarried heterosexual employees.  In addition, 
states and municipalities have been increasing the potential of such litigation by 
passing laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and marital 
status especially in the areas of housing and employment.15 
This Note examines the potential of such legal challenges when employers use 
the narrow definition in structuring their domestic partner benefit programs.  In 
addition, avoiding challenges by simply not offering benefits will be discussed.  
However, before discussing any discrimination issues, this Note will begin with 
some background and definitions that will bring the reader up-to-date on domestic 
partner benefits as they are interpreted today. 
II.  DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP DEFINED 
A.  Background:  The Changing Definition of Family 
Since 1970, the number of cohabitating Americans increased by more than 400 
percent.16  Nearly three million of the 93 million households in the United States 
consist of unmarried couples.17  Single-parent households make up an additional 
fifteen percent of families.  Many of these single-parents have unmarried partners.18  
As these statistics show, the traditional family—a working dad, stay-at-home mom, 
                                                                
13Jill Hodges, 'Partner' Benefits May Not Apply to Heterosexuals/Employers Can 
Encounter Thickets When They Extend Benefits Beyond Traditional Boundaries, STAR TRIB., 
June 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6915860. 
14See cases cited infra pp. 22-35. 
15Lewis Becker, Recognition of Domestic Partnerships by Governmental Entities and 
Private Employers, 1 NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 90, 92 (1995) 
<http://sunsite.unc.edu/gaylaw/issue1/becker.html>; see also Michele Matassa Flores, Bottom 
Line Determines Benefits for Unmarried Partners, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994, available in 
1994 WL 3648933 ("The city of Seattle and King County have laws against discriminating on 
the basis of sexual orientation or marital status."). 
16J. Robert Cowan, The New Family Plan:  Employee Benefits and the Non-Traditional 
Spouse, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 617, 618 (1993-94); David G. Richardson, Family Rights 
for Unmarried Couples, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117, 117 (1993). 
17Cowan, supra note 16, at 618; D'Vera Cohn, Cohabitating Couples Are a Settled Bunch; 
Many Unwed Partners Own Homes, Have Children, Census Reveals, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 
1994, available in 1994 WL 2277358; Ruth Padawer, Unwed, Uninsured Domestic Partners 
Press for Reforms, RECORD, Dec. 5, 1993, available in 1993 WL 7909956. 
18Cowan, supra note 16, at 618. 
284 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 13:281 
two kids and a dog—is near extinction.19  In fact, census data demonstrates fewer 
than ten percent of current households consist of this so-called traditional family.20 
The concept of family has largely been founded on the existence of marriage, but 
the legal definition of family has become quite unsettled.21  Depending upon the 
purpose, courts and legislatures have defined family differently.22  However, the U.S. 
Census Bureau has remained somewhat with the traditional concept of family by 
defining it as "two or more persons related by birth, marriage or adoption who reside 
in the same household.”23 
More and more Americans today are expanding this concept of family by 
thinking of family as people to whom they have some emotional tie as opposed to 
merely a bloodline relationship.24  In 1989, a survey conducted by Massachusetts 
Mutual Life Insurance Company asked 1,200 randomly selected adults to define the 
word "family."25  Almost three-quarters of the survey respondents chose the more 
broad description of family as being "a group of people who love and care for one 
another."26  Only twenty-two percent of the respondents chose the traditional 
description of family as being "group of peoples related by blood, marriage, or 
adoption."27 
In California, a task force on the family designed a functional approach to family 
by suggesting that family could be defined by the "functions" performed by each of 
its members.28  These functions included: 
(1) maintaining the physical health and safety of family members by 
providing for their shelter, food, clothing, health care, and economic 
sustenance; (2) providing conditions for emotional growth, motivation, 
and self-esteem within a context of love and security; (3) helping to shape 
a belief system from which goals and values are derived, and encouraging 
shared responsibility for family and community; (4) teaching social skills 
and critical thinking, promoting life-long education, and providing 
                                                                
19Frank Swoboda, Extending the Benefits Umbrella to a Wider World; Consulting Firm 
Finds Relatively Few Firms Making Domestic Partners Eligible, WASH. POST, June 4, 1995, 
available in 1995 WL 2096955. 
20Suzanne B. Goldberg, Employment Benefits and Insurance:  Working with Your Client to 
Achieve Full and Equal Benefits, 232 PRACTICING L. INST. 157, 159 (1994). 
21Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of “Family,” 26 GONZ. L. 
REV. 91, 96 (1990/1991). 
22Id. 
23Id. 
24Id. 
25Id. at 97; see also Richardson, supra note 16, at 119. 
26Treuthart, supra note 21, at 97. 
27Richardson, supra note 16, at 119. 
28Id.  Treuthart, supra note 21, at 97. 
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guidance in responding to culture and society; and (5) creating a place for 
recreation and recuperation from external stresses.29 
This functional definition of family is consistent with societal policies of the 
promotion of marriage and the encouragement of stable families.30  It is possible to 
have traditional families based on a legal marriage where none of the above 
mentioned functions are present.  This type of family may further the societal policy 
of the promotion of marriage, but it does not encourage or further the policy of 
family stability.31 
If we were to use this functional approach to families, many non-traditional 
families, such as those not based on a valid marriage, would be legitimized.32  As it 
applies to domestic partner benefits, only those families that promote societal family 
values would be extended such benefits.33  Companies would not have to worry about 
unmarried employees signing up "roommates" or "friends."34 
In addition to the American public redefining the concept of family, our courts 
have begun to recognize that the traditional concept of family is changing.  For 
instance, in 1989, the New York Court of Appeals decided that the definition of 
family should be interpreted broadly.  The court in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co. 
believed a more realistic view of a family includes a long-term relationship 
"characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence."35  
In Braschi, a life partner of a deceased tenant in a rent-controlled apartment moved 
for a preliminary injunction to prevent eviction.36  Under New York City Rent and 
Eviction Regulations, a landlord, upon the death of a rent-control tenant, may not 
dispossess "either the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member 
of the deceased tenant's family who has been living with the tenant."37  The court 
believed that the determination as to whether an individual is entitled to noneviction 
protection under these regulations should be based upon an objective examination of 
the parties' relationship.38  The court suggested a number of factors including:  
exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, level of emotional and financial 
commitment, manner in which the parties held themselves out to society, and the 
reliance each of the parties placed on the other for daily family services.39 
                                                                
29Treuthart, supra note 21, at 97. 
30Richardson, supra note 16, at 119. 
31Id. 
32Id. 
33Id. 
34Id. 
35Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 1989). 
36Id. at 51. 
37Id. at 50. 
38Id. at 55. 
39Id.  See, e.g., Joan E. Schaffner, The Essence of Marriage, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 195, 
204 (1997) (book review) ("[T]he court, in deciding whether Mr. Braschi and his male 
life-partner of ten years comprised a ‘family’ under the New York rent control regulations, 
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Since Braschi, New York has amended its rent control ordinance to include eight 
enumerated factors to determine whether a family exists: 
1) the longevity of the relationship; 2) sharing of household and family 
expenses; 3) intermingling of finances as evidenced by joint bank 
accounts, personal and real property, credit cards, and loan obligations; 4) 
engaging in family-type activities such as jointly attending family 
functions and social and recreational activities; 5) formalizing of legal 
obligations and responsibilities to each other by executing wills naming 
each other as executor and beneficiary, conferring upon each other the 
authority to make health care decisions, and making a domestic 
partnership declaration; 6) holding themselves out as family members to 
other family members and society in general; 7) regularly performing 
family functions such as caring for each other or each other's extended 
family members, and 8) engaging in any other action which evidences the 
intention of creating a long-term, emotionally-committed relationship.40 
These eight enumerated factors came directly out of the Braschi decision.41 
The Braschi court recognized that the legal or traditional definition of family was 
inconsistent with the purpose of the rent-control ordinance which was to protect 
sudden eviction of family members.42  This court emphasized relational interests 
instead of legal and bloodline interests when defining a family.43 
In 1983, the California courts also recognized that unmarried couples could be 
similar in relationship to that of a married couple.44  In Butcher v. Superior Court of 
Orange County, a woman sued for loss of consortium when her live-in-partner 
suffered personal injuries after being struck by an automobile driven by Butcher.45  
At the time of the accident, the couple had lived together for eleven and one half  
years, had two children together, filed joint income tax returns, and had joint bank 
accounts.46  Butcher moved for summary judgment on the woman's claim based on 
the argument that there was no valid or legal marriage between the couple.  The trial 
court denied Butcher's motion and he appealed.47  The appellate court recognized a 
right of the unmarried woman to bring a claim of loss of consortium where the 
plaintiff can show that the relationship parallels that of a marital relationship.48  The 
                                                          
explained that a ‘more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two 
adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and 
financial commitment and interdependence.’). 
40Richardson, supra note 16, at 120. 
41Id. 
42Id. 
43Id. 
44Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
45Id. at 59. 
46Id. at 60. 
47Id. 
48Id. at 70. 
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court concluded that "evidence of the stability and significance of the relationship 
could be demonstrated by the duration of the relationship; whether the parties have a 
mutual contract; the degree of economic cooperation and entanglement; exclusivity 
of sexual relations; and whether there is a 'family' relationship with children."49  
Thus, the court recognized that more than a relationship's legal status should be 
considered when granting consortium rights to couples.50 
However, not all courts are willing to set tradition aside and opt for the more 
modern view of family relationships.  In Elden v. Sheldon, the Supreme Court of 
California overruled Butcher.51  The court believed the inquiry as to whether a 
relationship was "stable and significant" was too difficult a burden to impose on the 
courts.52  The court gave a laundry list of cases supporting its holding that a loss of 
consortium claim is founded on a legal marriage, and absent such a marital 
relationship, the right to recover does not exist.53 
Many private organizations have also thrown their hats into the ring to come up 
with definitions of family that meet the modern trend towards broad definition.  The 
Home Economics Association defines family as: 
[T]wo or more persons who share resources, share responsibilities for 
decisions, share values and goals, and have commitments to one another 
over a period of time.  The family is that climate that one comes home to; 
and it is that network of sharing and commitment that most accurately 
describes the family unit, regardless of blood, legalities, adoption or 
marriage.54 
In 1978, the American Humanist Association stated "any two people...wishing to 
make a commitment to one another...should be considered a family...and receive 
those benefits accorded to families by society.  Blood kinship should not be required 
of family members, nor should marriages."55  In addition, in December 1994, the 
U.S. Office of Personnel Management published a new rule that defines family as 
"spouses, parents, children, brothers and sisters and their spouses and 'any individual 
related by blood or affinity whose close association with the employee is the 
equivalent of a family relationship.'"56  It is hoped that this new rule will allow 
federal workers use of their sick leave to provide care for ill domestic partners.57 
                                                                
49Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 70. 
50Richardson, supra note 16, at 120. 
51Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 590 (Cal. 1988). 
52Id. 
53Id. at 589. 
54Factoids on Domestic Partnership Benefits (visited Mar. 1, 1998) 
<http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-fac.html>. 
55Id. 
56Id. 
57Id. 
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It should be noted, however, that not everyone subscribes to this new broad 
definition of family.58   The National Pro-Family Coalition adopted at the 1981 White 
House Conference on Families the following definition of family: "persons who are 
related by blood, marriage or adoption."59  The Coalition's definition excludes 
"committed relationships established by unmarried heterosexual partners and lesbian, 
gay, or bisexual partners, as well as any children in their relationships."60  In 
addition, the definition excludes "'marriages' or commitments among more than two 
adults and relationships between stepparents and stepchildren--even though such 
individuals might very strongly identify themselves as being family members of one 
another."61 
However, the broader definition of family seems to be winning out.  For 
example, in 1992, the American Heritage Dictionary changed the words "blood, 
marriage or adoption" in its definition of family, and, instead, described it as "[t]wo 
or more people who share goals or values, have long-term commitments to one 
another, and reside usually in the same dwelling place."62 
Although there are cases where the courts are reluctant to redefine the traditional 
concept of family, it is clear from the attitudes of the American public and cases 
where the courts have applied a broader definition that a gradual change in the status 
of the nontraditional family is occurring.  While some jurisdictions are ready to 
redefine the concept the family, others are not.63  As a result, it is still unclear as to 
how these nontraditional family relationships will be treated by employers when 
offering benefits to their employees. 
B.  Definition and Requirements 
1.  What is a Domestic Partnership? 
Although there is currently no standard legal definition of a domestic partnership, 
most definitions include the following elements: "1) the couple live together and 
have a close, personal relationship; 2) they are responsible for each other's welfare, 
as evidenced by financial interdependence; 3) they are not legally married to anyone 
else; 4) they are not related by blood."64  Not every definition of domestic partnership 
includes heterosexual and homosexual partners.  For example, Stanford University 
                                                                
58Kris Franklin, "A Family Like Any Other Family:"  Alternative Methods of Defining 
Family Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1027, 1029 (1990/1991). 
59Id. 
60Id. at 1030. 
61Id. 
62Living in the Past, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3684053. 
63Stephen N. Hargrove, Domestic Partnerships Benefits:  Redefining Family in the Work 
Place, 6 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 49, 52 (1994). 
64Sample Proposal for Domestic Partner Benefits (visited Mar. 1, 1998) 
<http://www.hrc.org> [hereinafter Sample Proposal]; See also Christine Woolsey, Benefits for 
Domestic Partners No Longer Rare, BUS. INS., Apr. 4, 1994, available in 1994 WL 3834290 
("Most domestic partner definitions include three requirements:  the partners must be involved 
in a committed relationship; must live together; and must be financially interdependent."). 
1999] DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP BENEFITS 289 
defines a domestic partner as "the partner of an eligible employee who is of the same 
sex and shares a long-term commitment."65 
Regardless of gender requirements, it appears that domestic partnership is more 
than cohabitation without the legal status of marriage.66  The major advantage of 
domestic partnership is the increasing recognition of the entity by both business and 
government through the offering of employment benefits that traditionally have only 
been offered to legally married couples.67  It has become a means through which 
equality can be achieved among all employees regardless of sexual orientation, and 
in some instances, marital status.68 
2.  Domestic Partnership Ordinances 
Domestic partnership registration is currently available in a limited number of 
jurisdictions.69  This registration procedure is established through local ordinance.70  
Registration usually involves the filing of an affidavit attesting to the creation of 
such partnership and the payment of a small fee.71  Various eligibility requirements, 
often resembling those requirements to enter into marriage, may be imposed on the 
applicants.72  Common requirements may include:  "the parties be at least 18 years 
old, that each be mentally competent, that the parties not be related by blood ties 
closer than would bar marriage in the state, and that neither of the parties have an 
existing marriage or domestic partnership."73  Some may require that a previous 
domestic partnership have been terminated for a minimum period of time before a 
new registration can be filed.74 
In addition, ordinances may require that the parties reside together, declare they 
have a committed relationship, and assume an obligation for the basic living 
expenses of the other.75  Some municipalities may require additional formalities such 
as witnesses, notarization of declaration, and statements under oath concerning the 
partners' qualifications.76  In some cities, the registration becomes part of public 
record.  For example, Ann Arbor and San Francisco registrees are given the option to 
have the registration filed or to simply retain a copy to be shown on an as needed 
                                                                
65Donald E. Coleman, UC Weighs Partner Benefits.  Faculty, Staff and Students Would Be 
Included in the University's Plan, FRESNO BEE, July 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3910818. 
66Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership:  Recognition and Responsibility, 32 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 163, 164 (1995). 
67Id. 
68Id. at 166. 
69Treuthart, supra note 21, at 101. 
70Id. at 101-02. 
71Id. at 102. 
72Becker, supra note 15, at 91. 
73Id. 
74Id. 
75Id. 
76Id. 
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basis.77  In addition, some cities require that at least one partner reside or work in the 
city.78 
In general, ordinances allow for termination of the domestic partnership by a 
unilateral act of one of the partners.79  A statement or affidavit of termination usually 
must be filed with the city and a copy of such notice must be sent to the other 
partner.80  Termination of the partnership automatically occurs upon the death of one 
of the partners.81 
The City of Berkeley, California was the first city to adopt a domestic partnership 
ordinance.82  The policy was adopted on December 4, 1984 with dental coverage 
being available on April 1, 1985 and medical coverage available on July 1, 1985.83  
Its policy requires couples to file an affidavit attesting that they have lived together 
at least six months and "share common necessities of life."84  Each partner must be at 
least eighteen years old, "declare that they are each other's sole domestic partner and 
that they are 'responsible for their common welfare.'"85  A statement of termination 
must be filed when the partnership is dissolved.86  A new partnership could not be 
entered into for at least six months.87 
Today, over fifty municipalities offer some sort of domestic partnership plan.88  
State employers include Commonwealth of Massachusetts, State of New York, and 
State of Vermont.89 
                                                                
77Becker, supra note 15, at 91. 
78Id. (Minneapolis and San Francisco limit joint or domestic partnership registration to 
couples where at least one partner lives or works in the city.  Other cities, such as Berkeley 
and West Hollywood allow non-residents to register.). 
79Id. 
80Id. 
81Id. 
82Robert L. Eblin, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace:  Equitable 
Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067, 1072 (1990). 
83Id. at 1072. 
84Id. 
85Id. 
86Id. 
87Eblin, supra note 82, at 1072. 
88A Look at Employers Offering Domestic Partner Health Benefits, GANNETT NEWS 
SERVICE, July 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8832628 (municipalities include:  Alameda, 
California; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, 
Massachusetts; Brookline, Massachusetts; Burlington, Vermont; Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
Carrboro, North Carolina; Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Chicago, Illinois; Corvallis, Oregon; 
Denver, Colorado; East Lansing, Michigan; Hartford, Connecticut; Iowa City, Iowa; Ithaca, 
New York; Laguna Beach, California; Los Angeles, California; Madison, Wisconsin; 
Middlebury, Vermont; New Orleans Louisiana; New York, New York; Oakland, California; 
Oak Park, Illinois; Olympia, Washington; Portland, Maine; Rochester, New York; 
Sacramento, California; San Diego, California; San Francisco, California; Santa Cruz, 
California; Seattle, Washington; Shorewood Hills, Wisconsin; Springfield, Massachusetts; St. 
Paul, Minnesota; Takoma Park, Maryland; Tucson, Arizona; West Hollywood, California; 
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In addition, some smaller municipalities are beginning to recognize domestic 
partnerships.  In May of 1997, the 11,700 person town of Tumwater, Alaska became 
one of the smallest towns in America to grant benefits to domestic partners of 
municipal employees.90  The town is hoping that this will attract and maintain good 
employees.91 
3.  Private Employers 
The extension of domestic partner benefits in the private sector is generally seen 
as an outgrowth of such coverage at the government level.92  However, domestic 
partnership in the private sector can be traced as far back as 1982 when a union at 
New York's Village Voice newspaper obtained domestic partner benefits for its 
employees.93  Up to 1990, only five companies offered benefits to domestic 
partners.94  However, one commentator estimates that since then, there has been at 
least a one-hundred percent increase in the number of companies offering such 
benefits each year.95 
Private employers may require registration and other eligibility requirements 
similar to those imposed by municipalities offering benefits to domestic partners.96  
In most situations, the couple wanting to acquire benefits under a domestic 
partnership must sign an affidavit.97  Ideal affidavits will resemble the terms of a 
legal marriage.98  According to the Partners Task Force for Gay and Lesbian 
Couples, the elements of an ideal affidavit include: 
(1) Neither of us is married[; (2)] We are both over 18 years of age[; (3)] 
We were mentally competent to consent to contract when our domestic 
                                                          
West Palm Beach, Florida; Alameda County, California; Arlington County, Virginia; Dane 
County, Wisconsin; Hennepin County, Minnesota; King County, Washington; Los Angeles 
County, California; Marin County, California; Multnomah County, Oregon; San Francisco 
County, California; San Mateo County, California; Santa Cruz County, California; Travis 
County, Texas; and Wayne County, Michigan). 
89Id.  See also Hargrove, supra note 63, at 50 (Ohio gives state employees sick and 
bereavement leave to care for domestic partners). 
90Small Town Grants Benefits to Domestic Partners of City Workers, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, May 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11488726. 
91Id. 
92Linda M. Laarman, Employer Health Coverage for Domestic Partners--Identifying the 
Issues, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., Mar. 22, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2938897. 
93Terry Wilson, Family Values Despite the Disney Brouhaha, Domestic Partnership 
Benefits Are Widely Available for Same-Sex Couples.  So Why Are Very Few Taking 
Advantage of Them?, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3563332. 
94Id. 
95Id. 
96Becker, supra note 15, at 97. 
97Anatomy of a Domestic Partnership Affidavit, the Good, the Ugly, and the Bad (visited 
Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.buddybuddy.com/affidavi.html>. 
98Id. 
292 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 13:281 
partnership began[; (4)] We are the sole domestic Partner of each other 
and have no other domestic partners[; (5)] We agree to give notification of 
any change in the status of our agreement[; (6)] We share the common 
necessities of life and are responsible for each other's welfare[; and (7)] 
We declare under penalty of perjury that these statements are true and 
correct.99 
These affidavits can make partners potentially liable for each other's support and 
debts;100 therefore, before signing such an affidavit, an attorney should be 
consulted.101 
Although affidavits have elements similar to a legal marriage, those couples who 
are married do not have to sign such an affidavit.  Documents relating to domestic 
partnerships can be quite costly to prepare and maintain; whereas, married couples 
do not have the expense of preparing these documents and obtain more benefits than 
couples living in a domestic partnership.  Some employers may require additional 
documentation including one or more of the following:  (1) joint lease, mortgage, or 
deed; (2) joint ownership of vehicle; (3) joint ownership of checking account or 
credit account; (4) designation of the domestic partner as a beneficiary for the 
employee's life insurance or retirement benefits; (5) designation of the domestic 
partner as a beneficiary of the employee's will; (6) designation of the domestic 
partner as holding power of attorney for health care; or (7) shared household 
expenses.102 
In addition, private employers may only offer benefits to same-sex couples and 
not to unmarried heterosexual couples.103  Employers often cite the fact that 
heterosexuals have the option to marry as the reason for the distinction.104 
4.  Costs and Other Concerns 
However employers decide to structure their domestic partner benefits, costs 
have proven to be relatively small.105  If a company chooses to extend benefits to 
both homosexual and heterosexual domestic partners, enrollment increases range 
from about one to ten percent.106  Program costs will vary depending upon the 
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106See generally Larry Holyoke, Domestic Partner Benefits Lag Behind Other Regions, ST. 
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benefits covered and the portion of the benefit paid by the employer.107  In addition, 
companies offering medical benefits may experience a higher initial cost because 
many of these new unmarried partners have been left out of the medical system for a 
while.108 
Low utilization of domestic partner benefits can be attributed to a number of 
factors.  These include:  domestic partner may already receive benefits from another 
source; employee may be reluctant to disclose his or her personal relationship to the 
employer; benefits paid to unmarried partners are taxable; employees may be 
hesitant about signing a legal document which declares financial responsibility for 
the partner; and insurability problems such as pre-existing conditions may preclude 
coverage.109  These factors may explain why few employees who have access to such 
benefits use them.110 
Of the small number of employees that do take advantage of such benefits, costs 
tend to be lower than those of their married counterparts.111  The lower costs may be 
attributed to eligible employees being younger and healthier.112  In addition, they 
tend not to have children that need to be covered as dependents.113 
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When same-sex partners are involved, companies often worry that costs will 
increase due to HIV and AIDS related claims.114  However, the U.S. Government and 
insurance actuaries have estimated that heart disease, cancer, and the costs of 
premature birth can be much higher than the lifetime cost of treating a person with 
AIDS.115  For example, the average lifetime medical cost for treatment of HIV is 
$119,000 per patient as compared to premature infant care which can cost up to $1 
million.116 
In addition to cost concerns, employers may fear that domestic partner provisions 
invite fraud.117  Critics argue that employees will enroll sick friends and relatives.  
However, no evidence of fraud has been demonstrated thus far.118  Because of the 
requirements employees must meet to qualify for domestic partnership, it is unlikely 
there will be substantial fraud.119  In addition, the threat of discharge and/or criminal 
sanctions will likely deter any fraudulent claims by employees.120 
If an employee should sign up a sick friend or relative, pre-existing condition 
clauses may limit benefits for illnesses existing on enrollment.121  In addition, the 
employee may have to pay more in premium than the friend or relative will receive 
in benefits.122  Therefore, fraud and abuse of domestic partnership benefits seems to 
be minimal or nonexistent.  The fraud and abuse should be no more than that which 
currently exists with marriage.123  Companies normally do not ask for proof of 
marriage, and employees are generally free to sign up their spouses.124 
As this discussion reveals, cost concerns and potential for abuse is minimal in the 
area of domestic partner benefits.  Companies extending benefits to both same- and 
opposite-sex domestic partners will find that their costs are slightly higher than those 
employers that offer benefits to same-sex couples only.125  This is because there will 
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be more heterosexuals than homosexuals taking advantage of these benefits.126  
However, employers find that their fears are unwarranted and are generally pleased 
with the outcome of their program.127 
5.  Tax Implications 
Section 106 of the Internal Revenue code excludes from the employee's gross 
income employer-provided group health insurance coverage for the employee, the 
employee's spouse, and the employee's dependents.128  Section 105(b) of the Code 
excludes from the employee's gross income any additional benefits received through 
the employer-provided health coverage that directly relate to medical expenses 
incurred by the employee, his or her spouse, and dependents.129  However, section 
104(a)(3) of the Code requires that the employee pay taxes on the difference between 
the fair market value of such coverage and the amount the employee paid for the 
coverage if the employer-provided health insurance is extended to anyone besides 
the employee, his or her spouse and dependents.  Additional benefits such as those 
discussed in 105(b) of the Code are also to be included in the employee's gross 
income if those benefits were extended to any person other than the employee, his or 
her spouse, and dependents.130 
In private letter rulings, the IRS has deferred to state law in defining the term 
"spouse."  However, in its most recent ruling in January of 1997, the IRS relied on 
the newly enacted Defense of Marriage Act in defining the term.131  The Defense of 
Marriage Act provides that same-sex domestic partners will not be treated as spouses 
in regards to any federal law.132  The IRS concluded that same-sex partners could not 
be afforded the preferential tax treatment that has been afforded to spouses.133 
However, the partner may still qualify as a dependent under section 152 of the 
Code allowing the partner preferential treatment as the employee's dependent.134  
Section 152(a)(9) of the Code defines a dependent for income tax purposes as any 
individual residing in the taxpayer's home that receives more than half of his or her 
support from the taxpayer.135  However, section 152(b)(5) of the Code provides that 
such dependent cannot be claimed for income tax purposes if the relationship 
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between the taxpayer and the dependent is in violation of local law.136  In other 
words, if state law prohibits cohabitation between unmarried people, then the 
domestic partner could not qualify as a dependent.137 
If the domestic partner does not qualify as a dependent under these provisions, 
the employee will be taxed on the value of the coverage pursuant to section 61 of the 
Code.138  The IRS held in a private letter ruling that the fair market value used to 
calculate the amount on which the employee is to pay taxes should be determined by 
the value of the group rate.139  However, the IRS did not elaborate on how to 
determine the fair market value of group coverage other than to say it could be less 
or more than individual coverage or the subjective value of the coverage to the 
employee.140 
Employers offering benefits to domestic partners will have to determine the fair 
market of value of such benefits for withholding and reporting purposes.  This may 
be a difficult process due to lack of clear guidelines from the IRS.141  However, a 
company considering the offering of such benefits might be wise to ask for 
assistance on such calculation from employers already offering such benefits. 
C.  Marriage v. Domestic Partnership:  How Do Benefits Compare? 
Marriage is generally a relationship between two individuals and the state, 
whereas, a domestic partner benefit plan is a relationship between two individuals 
and an employer or between two individuals and a municipality.142  Individuals 
barred from marriage or choosing not to get married can spend as much as $3,000 on 
legal related expenses to set up a domestic partnership, whereas, a marriage license 
typically costs about $35.143  In addition, marriage licenses self perpetuate, and 
domestic partnerships may require additional expense in the periodic review of legal 
documents.144 
The Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples charts the comparison of 
benefits for marriage and domestic partnerships.  The following is a partial 
representation of this chart.145 
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Benefits Comparison at the State Level 
    Legal Marriage Domestic Partnership 
1.   Assumption of Spouse’s Pension Automatic  No 
2.   Bereavement Leave  Automatic in  Only certain  
    most places workplaces 
3.   Burial Determination  Automatic  No 
4.   Certain Property Rights  Automatic  No 
5.   Child Custody   Automatic  No 
6.   Crime Victim’s Recovery Benefits Automatic  No 
7.   Divorce Protections  Automatic  No 
8.   Domestic Violence Intervention Automatic  Only in some 
      jurisdictions 
9.   Exemption of Property Tax on Automatic where No 
      Partner’s Death   available 
10. Housing Lease Transfer  Automatic where Only in New York 
    Available  City 
11. Inheritance   Automatic  Will necessary and is 
      Contestable. Domestic 
      Partnership could 
      Influence court 
      Decision 
12. Immunity from Testifying  Automatic  No 
13. Insurance Breaks   Automatic  No 
14. Joint Adoption and Foster Care Probable  No.  Often reviewed by 
      court.  Some states  
      prohibit adoption and 
      foster care. 
15. Joint Bankruptcy   Automatic  No 
16. Joint Parenting (Insurance Coverage, Automatic  No 
      School Records) 
17. Medical Decisions on Behalf of Partner Automatic  No. Physician’s 
      directives or powers of 
      attorney are necessary 
      with few exceptions 
18. Reduced Rate Memberships  Automatic where Only certain 
    available  organizations 
19. Sick leave to care for partner  Automatic where Only certain 
    available  organizations 
20. Visitation of Partner’s Children Probable, depending No. Often must go to 
    on divorce decree court. 
21. Visitation of Partner in hospital Automatic  often prohibited. 
      (intensive care)     Physician’s directives 
      or powers of attorney 
      must be drawn. 
22. Visitation of Partner in Prison Automatic  Only certain cities 
23. Wrongful death benefits   Automatic  No 
       (Loss of consort) 
Benefits Comparison in the Federal System 
(Includes Civil Servants and the Military) 
    Legal Marriage Domestic Partnership 
1.  Access to Military Stores  Automatic  No 
2.  Assumption of Spouse’s Pension Automatic  No 
3.  Bereavement Leave  Automatic  No 
4.  Insurance Breaks   Automatic  No 
5.  Medical Decisions on Behalf of Partner Automatic  No 
     at Military of VA Hospitals 
6.  Sick Leave to Care for Partner Automatic  No 
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    Legal Marriage Domestic Partnership 
7.  Veteran’s Discounts  Automatic  No 
8.  Visitation of Partners in Hospital or Automatic  No 
      Prison 
Benefits Comparison for All U.S. Citizens 
    Legal Marriage Domestic Partnership 
1.  Immigration   Automatic  No 
2.  Social Security Survivor Benefits Automatic  No 
 
As this comparison shows, the benefits bestowed upon married couples are far 
more than those given to individuals living in a domestic partnership. Thus, 
domestic partnerships are a poor second to legal marriage; however, there are still 
benefits to such a relationship.  These include:  (1) health insurance benefits they 
would otherwise be unable to get; (2) social recognition of the relationship; (3) 
creation of a dialog on discrimination issues in the workplace; and (4) proof of 
growing recognition of the importance of attracting and keeping employees.146 
III.  LEGAL ISSUES:  CHALLENGES TO DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS 
A.  Preemption 
Generally, federal preemption is not a concern; however, ERISA is one federal 
law that limits the ability of local governments to provide equal benefits between 
married employees and employees registered in a domestic partnership.147  It 
preempts any law that "relates to any employee benefit plan described" in ERISA, 
unless it is specifically exempted.148 
While ERISA does preempt local ordinances, most preemption will take place at 
the state level.  However, most activity in the area of domestic partnership is taking 
place at the local level, and it is unclear as to the extent to which these local 
governments may recognize these new relationships that are not recognized by state 
law.149 
Most states have strengthened local self-government by providing for municipal 
home rule.150  Home rule provisions are generally of two types.  The first is where 
the municipality is treated as a state within a state.  The city has full police power 
over local affairs and some immunity from state legislative interference.151  A court 
may find it difficult to distinguish between matters of state concern and local 
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affairs.152  The court in Lilly v. City of Minneapolis,153 discussed infra, struggled with 
just such an issue.  The second type of home rule is generally referred to as the 
"legislative" model.  This model gives local governments all the powers the 
legislature could grant except those restricted or denied to the municipality by the 
legislature.154 
Generally, however, if a local government forbids something authorized by the 
state or allows something forbidden by the state, the provision will be struck down.155  
Express preemption is unlikely in the field of domestic partnerships as no state has 
expressly prohibited municipalities from recognizing these relationships thus far.156  
In addition, courts frequently allow local regulation that seems to conflict with a 
state statute by prohibiting something the state has permitted by implication; 
however, if the state is held to have occupied the field, then the regulation will be 
struck down.157 
Even if there is no conflicting state statute, local governments may be precluded 
from legislating "if the state has occupied or preempted the field in a matter of 
statewide or general concern."158  California's Supreme Court has come up with the 
following test to determine whether implied preemption exists: 
In determining whether the Legislature has preempted by implication to 
the exclusion of local regulation we must look to the whole purpose and 
scope of the legislative scheme.  There are three tests:  ‘(1) the subject 
matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to 
clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; 
(2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched 
in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not 
tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has 
been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature 
that the adverse effect of . . . local [regulation] on the transient citizens of 
the state outweighs the possible benefit to the [local government].’159 
A court may also strike down a regulation where it concludes that the ordinance 
conflicts with state policy.160 
It is difficult to determine whether the court will find that a field has been 
preempted.  Each jurisdiction has its own home rule provisions and statutory 
schemes.161  However, in recent years, local governments have been allowed to make 
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strong laws in areas such as public health, education, housing, employment, and 
mass transit.  Municipalities have been given fairly wide latitude in these areas.162 
Although marriage and divorce are regulated at the state level, this does not 
necessarily preempt the entire area of domestic relations law.163  However, local 
governments would be expressly preempted from providing benefits such as the 
ability to file joint tax returns or the right to adopt children.  These benefits and 
consequences of traditional marriage could not be provided by local ordinance to 
domestic partners.164 
B.  Court Decisions in the Area of Preemption 
Lilly v. City of Minneapolis:  Health Insurance for Domestic Partners Denied 
The case of Lilly v. City of Minneapolis involves a domestic partnership 
ordinance for the City of Minneapolis.165  The City is a home rule charter 
municipality whose charter was adopted by election on November 2, 1920.166  On 
January 25, 1991, City Council passed the Domestic Partnerships Ordinance which 
defines domestic partners as two adults who: 
(1) Are not related by blood closer than permitted under marriage laws of 
the state; (2) Are not married or related by marriage; (3) Are competent to 
enter into a contract; (4) Have no other domestic partner with whom the 
household is shared, or with whom the adult person has another domestic 
partner; (5) Are jointly responsible to each other for the necessities of life; 
(6) Are committed to one another to the same extent as married persons 
are to each other, except for the traditional marital status and 
solemnities.167 
On November 17, 1992, the Commission on Civil Rights for the City ruled that 
the employee benefits program discriminated against lesbian employees of the 
Library Board based upon their "affectional preference."168  On April 2, 1993, City 
Council passed a resolution authorizing reimbursement to city employees for health 
insurance costs of domestic partners and qualified blood relatives who are not 
considered dependents under current City health plans.169  The resolution excludes 
reimbursement if the domestic partner or family member has access to other group 
health insurance coverage or Medicare.170 
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The court of appeals held that council resolutions authorizing reimbursement to 
city employees for domestic partners' and non-dependent blood relatives' health 
insurance costs were ultra vires and without legal force and effect.171  The court 
reasoned that insurance coverage for political subdivisions' employees and their 
dependents was of statewide concern.172  Therefore, the city's power to act must be 
narrowly construed unless the legislature has expressed otherwise.173 
The court considered the legislative history of the 1993 amendments to the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act.174  The Act was amended to prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.175  Prior to the vote to approve the amendment, the 
author of the bill, Senator Spear, stated:  "There is nothing in here about domestic 
partners benefits.  Nothing that could lead to it."176  Given this statement, the court 
thought it was apparent that the legislature did not intend to give the same health care 
benefits to domestic partners as are available to married employees.177  Therefore, the 
City cannot expand a state statute with respect to whom may receive medical 
benefits when the legislature has made it a matter of statewide concern and has 
defined who may receive such benefits.178 
Atlanta v. McKinney:  No Employee Benefits for Persons Who Are Not 
Dependents under State Law 
The Atlanta v. McKinney case also concerned the issue of preemption in domestic 
partner law.179  The case involved a challenge to four city ordinances "that prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, establish a domestic partnership 
registry for jail visitation, and extend insurance and other employee benefits to 
domestic partners of [C]ity employees."180  The court held that the City had the 
power to enact the anti-discrimination and registry ordinances, but exceeded its 
authority in extending employee benefits to persons not defined as "dependents" 
under state law.181  
As to the extension of employee benefits, the issue before the court was "whether 
the [C]ity impermissibly expanded the definition of dependent to include domestic 
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partners."182  The Municipal Home Rule Act (MHRA) grants cities the authority to 
provide insurance benefits for city employees and their dependents, but does not 
define the term "dependent."183  However, other state statutes defined a dependent 
either as a "spouse, child, or one who relies on another for financial support."184  The 
court held that domestic partners did not meet any of the statutory definitions of 
"dependent."185  Since the court found it was beyond the City's authority to define 
dependents inconsistent with state law, the benefits ordinance was invalidated as 
ultra vires under MHRA and the Georgia Constitution.186 
Atlanta v. Morgan:  Domestic Partner Benefits Upheld 
After Atlanta v. McKinney, the Atlanta City Council passed another ordinance 
which provides certain insurance benefits to domestic partners of City employees 
who are registered as domestic partners under the City's registry.187  In enacting the 
ordinance, the City followed the holding in McKinney and eliminated from the 
ordinance's definition of dependent any language that recognized any new 
relationship similar to marriage.188  The new ordinance was again challenged.189 
The issue in this case was the same as that in McKinney:  "Whether the [C]ity 
acted within its authority to provide benefits to its employees and their dependents 
by defining 'dependent' consistent with State law."190  The court determined that it 
must look to the ordinary meaning of the term "dependent" in order to decide 
whether the definition provided in the City's benefit ordinance is consistent with 
State law.191  The ordinance defines the term "dependent" as "one who relies on 
another for financial support."192  In addition, the domestic partner shall be dependent 
if: 
(i)  The employee makes contributions to the domestic partner of cash and 
supplies, and the domestic partner relies upon and uses those contributions 
to support himself/herself in order to maintain his or her standard of 
living.  The contributions may be at irregular intervals and of irregular 
amounts, but must have existed for at least six months, and must be 
continuing. 
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(ii)  The employee is obligated, based upon his/her commitment set forth 
in the Declaration of Domestic Partnership, to continue the financial 
support of the domestic partner for so long as the domestic partnership 
shall be in effect. 
(iii)  The domestic partner is supported, in whole or in part, by the 
employee's earnings, and has been for at least the last six months.193 
Based on the court's review of Georgia case law, the court concluded the 
ordinance's definition of dependent was consistent with the ordinary meaning of 
"dependent" and the definition attributed to the term as used in Georgia statutes.194  
The court looked to various dictionary definitions and prior case law.195  In finding 
that the definition was consistent with State law, the ordinance was found not to be 
in violation of either the Georgia Constitution or the Municipal Home Rule Act.196 
Anonymous v. City Light:  Federal Law Preemption 
After a decision in Anonymous v. City Light, federal law was found to preempt 
the application of the ruling to private employers.197  In this case, an employee of 
City Light was denied medical and dental benefits for her domestic partner.  The 
Human Rights Department ruled against City Light concluding that discrimination 
against "cohabitants" or "domestic partners" is a form of marital status 
discrimination which is prohibited under Seattle's Fair Employment Practices 
Ordinance (FEPO).198  The ruling was initially believed to apply to both city and 
private employers within Seattle; however, Seattle's city attorney later determined 
that provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
preempted the FEPO as applied to private employers.199 
C.  Other Court Challenges 
The following cases offer a framework of additional case law on the subject of 
domestic partner benefits. 
Donovan v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board of the State of California:  
Death Benefits Granted 
In Donovan v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board of the State of California, 
Earl Donovan was eventually awarded $25,000 in death benefits for the death of his 
live-in companion, Thomas Finnerty.200  Finnerty became one-hundred-percent 
                                                                
193Morgan, 492 S.E.2d at 195. 
194Id. 
195Id. 
196Id. at 196. 
197Eblin, supra note 82, at 1073-74. 
198Id. at 1074. 
199Id.  See also Rickel, supra note 3. 
200See Sue Nussbaum Averill, Desperately Seeking Status:  Same-Sex Couples Battle for 
Employment-Linked Benefits, 27 AKRON L. REV. 253, 257 (1993) (discussion of Donovan v. 
Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. of the State of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1982)). 
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disabled due to an injury sustained on the job.  He became seriously depressed about 
his disability and died after attempting suicide.201  Donovan filed a claim for death 
benefits alleging that Finnerty's injury led to his suicidal tendencies, and, therefore, 
his death was work-related.202 
The Workers' Compensation Board held that the two men's relationship was 
"illicit;" therefore, Donovan was not a "good faith member of Finnerty's household," 
and Donovan was awarded limited medical costs.203  Donovan appealed this decision 
to the California Court of Appeals, which remanded the decision back to the Board 
to decide the issue of dependency.204  The Board, relying on Marvin v. Marvin,205 
ruled that Donovan was a "good faith member of Finnerty's household and his total 
dependent."206  The court recognized that a gay person could be a "good faith 
member of another's household."  Therefore, that person could be considered the 
employee's dependent for workers' compensation purposes.207 
Brinkin v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.:  Funeral Leave Benefits Denied 
In Brinkin v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., Brinkin was denied funeral 
benefit leave when his same-sex partner of eleven years died.208  The benefit was 
automatically available to married employees.209  The union denied Brinkin's 
                                                                
201Id. 
202Id. at 257-58. 
203Id. at 258. 
204Id. 
205Marvin v. Marvin, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Cal. 1976) ("Woman who had lived with man for 
seven years without marriage brought suit to enforce alleged oral contract under which she 
was entitled to half the property which had been acquired during that period and taken in 
man's name, and to support payments. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, William A. 
Munnell, J., granted the judgment on the pleadings for defendant, and plaintiff appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Tobriner, J., held that provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the 
distribution of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship; that court should enforce 
express contracts between nonmarital partners except to the extent the contract is explicitly 
founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services, despite contention that such 
contracts violate public policy; that in the absence of express contract, the court should inquire 
into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates implied 
contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between 
the parties, and may also employ the doctrine of quantum meruit or equitable remedies such as 
constructive or resulting trust, when warranted by the facts of the case; that in the instant case 
plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action for breach of an express contract and furnished 
suitable basis on which trial court could render declaratory relief; and that the complaint also 
could be amended to state a cause of action founded on theory of implied contract or equitable 
relief."). 
206Averill, supra note 200, at 258. 
207Id. 
208See Id. at 260 (discussion of Brinkin v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 572 F. Supp. 236 
(N.D. Cal. 1985)); See also Eblin, supra note 82, at 1067, 1079 and n.105-10 (1990) 
(discussion of Brinkin v. South Pacific Transp. Co., No. A034147, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987)). 
209Averill, supra note 200, at 260. 
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grievance, and Brinkin brought action against the union and his employer.210  Brinkin 
brought his action in federal court alleging that the denial of funeral benefits violated 
his privacy rights under the California Constitution, violated the California Fair 
Employment Act and Housing Act, and violated the San Francisco police code.211  
The district court remanded the action back to the state court after concluding it had 
no jurisdiction in the case.212  
The case finally reached the California Court of Appeals where the court held 
that employers may lawfully grant benefits to married persons without offering them 
to unmarried persons.213  Brinkin was classified by the courts as a single, adult male 
and not an immediate family member of his domestic partner.214 
Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration:  Denial of Dental Benefits 
In Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration,215 the California Court of 
Appeals held that the denial of dental benefits to domestic partners of employees did 
not unlawfully discriminate against homosexual employees in violation of the Equal 
Protection clause because the Department's policy made a distinction on the basis of 
marital status not between heterosexual or homosexual employees.216  Because there 
was no discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, strict scrutiny analysis did 
not apply.217  In addition, the policy of restricting coverage to spouses and families 
was found to be reasonably related to the state's interest in promoting marriage.218  
Also, dental benefits under state plans qualified as bona fide fringe benefits and were 
exempted from marital status discrimination.219 
In Hinman, the employee, Hinman, and Larry Beatty had lived together for over 
twelve years.220  The two men owned a home together, placed their assets in a joint 
                                                                
210Id. 
211Id. 
212Id. 
213Id. 
214Id. 
215Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985); see also Averill, supra note 200, at 258, 259; Hargrove, supra note 63, at 51; see e.g., 
Statutory Protection for Gays and Lesbians in Private Employment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1625, 
1634 (1996) (citing Hinman as the leading case on the issue of employee benefits for 
homosexual life partners); Rita M. Neuman, Closing the Door on Cohabitants Under 
Wisconsin's Open Housing Law, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 965, 999 (1995) (using Hinman as support 
that public policy may be strong enough to override intent not to discriminate based on sexual 
orientation). 
216Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 516. 
217Id. 
218Id.  See also Todd R. Dickey, Reorienting the Workplace: Examining California's New 
Labor Code Section 1102.1 and Other Legal Protections Against Employment Discrimination 
Based on Sexual Orientation, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2297, 2319 (1993).  
219Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 516-17. 
220Id. at 520. 
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bank account, shared common necessities of life, and named each other as primary 
beneficiaries in their wills and life insurance policies.221 
Hinman applied for dental coverage for himself and Beatty under the state's 
employee dental plan; however, coverage for Beatty was denied.222  Hinman filed a 
letter of grievance with the Department, but his grievance was denied on the basis 
that Beatty did not qualify as a spouse or dependent under existing contracts or 
statutes.223  Hinman filed a petition for writ of mandate for declaratory relief and 
injunctive relief.  The Department responded by way of demurrer which was 
sustained by the trial court without leave to amend.224 
The court of appeals found that there were no allegations or evidence that 
benefits were denied based entirely on Hinman's sexual orientation, and this was a 
case of "alleged under-inclusiveness of governmental regulation or legislation."225  
Therefore, the differentiation between groups alleged to be "similarly situated" 
becomes the basis of a de facto discrimination claim.226 
Hinman argued that homosexual employees with same-sex partners are similarly 
situated to married heterosexual employees.227  He further argued that because 
homosexuals cannot legally marry, the term "spouse" is not neutral to homosexuals 
and is a classification based on both marital status and sexual orientation.228  
Therefore, Hinman believed the court must use strict scrutiny analysis because 
classifications based on sexual orientation are suspect.229 
The court disagreed with Hinman's arguments.  The eligibility requirements for 
the state dental plan excluded all nonspouses of both opposite- and same-sex 
employees.230  The court concluded, "[h]omosexuals are simply a part of the larger 
class of unmarried persons, to which also belong the employees' filial relations and 
parents, for example.  The terms have the same effect on the entire class of 
unmarried persons."231  Therefore, there was no difference in the effect of the 
eligibility requirement on unmarried heterosexual or homosexual employees.232  
                                                                
221Id. at 520-21. 
222Id. at 521. 
223Id. 
224Id. at 521. 
225Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 524. 
226Id. 
227Id. 
228Id. 
229Id. 
230Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 526. 
231Id. 
232Id. 
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Thus, Hinman is not similarly situated to married heterosexual employees but is 
similarly situated to unmarried heterosexual employees.233 
The court also found that the restriction of coverage to spouses and family of 
employees was reasonably related to the state's interest in promoting marriage.234  
California courts have allowed marital status discrimination as long as it is rationally 
related to a legitimate state purpose.235  The court found that the state has a legitimate 
interest in promoting marriage, and this interest can be furthered by "conferring 
statutory rights upon married persons which are not afforded unmarried partners."236 
This decision established a strong precedent in the area of domestic partner 
benefits for homosexual employees.  By not granting review, California's Supreme 
Court has established that denial of benefits to unmarried homosexual partners does 
not violate employment policy and statutory protections prohibiting sexual 
orientation discrimination.237 
Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission:  Denial of Family Health 
Insurance Coverage 
In Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission,238 the court held that an 
employer could limit dependent health insurance coverage to employees' spouses and 
children without violating marital status, sexual orientation, or gender provisions of 
the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.239  In addition, the court found that the rule did 
not violate state equal protection.240 
Phillips and Tommerup had a committed lesbian relationship in which they 
shared incomes, rented a home, and owned a car together.  They carried joint renters 
and car insurance and also took vacations together.  Tommerup had been financially 
dependent on Phillips for several years, because she was attending college in pursuit 
of her graduate degree.241  Phillips applied to her employing agency to change her 
health care benefits from single to family coverage to provide for Tommerup as her 
"dependent."242  The administrator of the state health insurance plan denied her 
application on the basis that Tommerup did not meet the definition of "dependent" 
under the applicable rules.243  Phillips filed a discrimination complaint with the 
                                                                
233Id.  See also Eblin, supra note 82, at 1079; Kate Latimer, Domestic Partners and 
Discrimination:  The Need for Fair Employment Compensation, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & 
POL'Y 329, 334 (1991). 
234Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 527-28. 
235Id. at 526. 
236Id. at 527. 
237Averill, supra note 200, at 259-60. 
238482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). 
239Id. at 123. 
240Id.  
241Id. at 124. 
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personnel commission which was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted, and the circuit court affirmed.244 
Phillips argues that limiting health insurance coverage to the employee's spouse 
and children discriminates against her on the basis of her marital status, sexual 
orientation, and gender in violation of the Fair Employment Act.245  The court 
disagreed with Phillips arguments and addressed each one in turn.246 
The court looked to the legislative history of the act to determine legislative 
intent.  It found that the legislature did not intend a violation of the act where married 
employees are treated differently than single employees under the current benefits 
scheme.  Nothing in the legislative history supported the contention that the state is 
prevented from providing benefits to an employee's spouse without extending them 
to an unmarried companion.247  In addition, the court found that there was no 
discrimination issue because Phillips was not "similarly situated" to a married 
employee in the context of a discrimination analysis.248  Phillips had no legal 
relationship to Tommerup.  The law imposed no duty of support and no 
responsibility for providing medical care as it did on married couples.249  Thus, 
Phillips's legal status was not found to be similar to that of a married employee, and, 
therefore, she has no claim of marital status discrimination.250 
Phillips's argument that she was discriminated against based on her sexual 
orientation was essentially the same position she took in her marital status 
discrimination argument.251  The court agreed with the personnel commission's ruling 
that she was not discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation because the 
challenged rule distinguishes between married and unmarried employees and not 
between homosexual and heterosexual employees.  Coverage would be denied for 
Tommerup if their relationship was that of an unmarried heterosexual couple.252  The 
court further notes that the fact Phillips and Tommerup cannot legally marry is not a 
basis for a claim of sexual orientation discrimination.  The claim is that the laws are 
unfair because they do not recognize homosexual marriages.253  It is this restriction 
that limits Phillips's eligibility for family coverage and that is for the legislature to 
change, not the courts.254 
Phillips also argued that she was being discriminated against because of her 
gender due to the fact she was being treated differently than similarly situated males.  
                                                                
244Phillips, 482 N.W.2d at 124. 
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The basis of her argument was that she could never qualify her partner as a 
"dependent" through the act of marriage, whereas, a male employee could marry 
Tommerup and qualify her as a dependent.255  The court again disagreed with 
Phillips and held that the only males she was similarly situated to were those with 
same sex partners, and that they also could not obtain coverage for their 
companions.256 
Phillips also made a claim that the rule violated the equal protection guarantees 
of the Wisconsin Constitution "in that it creates a classification of people who are 
denied certain employment benefits on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation 
and gender."257  The court rejected her argument and found that because the rule 
challenged in this case does not classify by sexual orientation and gender, that ends 
the inquiry into an equal protection claim.258 
The court in Phillips followed the same rationale as that used in Hinman.  Both 
courts refused to grant unmarried couples the same access to employment benefits as 
those provided to married couples.259 
Gay Teachers Association v. Board of Education of the City School Distroct of 
New York:  Health and Dental Benefits denied 
In Gay Teachers Association v. Board of Education of the City School District of 
New York, several teachers and employees sued the New York City Board of 
Education in order to obtain health and dental benefits for their domestic partners.260  
The employees were denied the benefits on the basis that only "legal spouses" were 
entitled to such benefits.261  The plaintiffs argued that this denial of benefits 
unlawfully discriminated against them on the basis of marital status and thereby 
constituted sexual orientation discrimination.262  In October of 1993, Mayor David 
Dinkins signed a court settlement which provides health benefits to all unmarried 
domestic partners of New York City employees.263 
Reep v. Commissioner of the Department of Employment and Training:  
Approval of Unemployment Benefits 
In Reep v. Commissioner of the Department of Employment and Training,264 the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the fact a "former employee was 
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256Phillips, 482 N.W.2d at 128. 
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258Id. at 129. 
259Averill, supra note 200, at 127. 
260183 A.2d 478, 575 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1st Dep't 1992). 
261Hargrove, supra note 63, at 51. 
262Id. 
263Id.  See also Vincent C. Green, Same-Sex Adoption:  An Alternative Approach to Gay 
Marriage in New York, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 399, 408 (1996). 
264593 N.E.2d 1297 (Mass. 1992); but see Davis v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 737 P.2d 1262 
(Wash. 1987) (women leaving employment to enter "meretricious relationship" are not eligible 
for unemployment compensation). 
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not married to her partner of thirteen years did not preclude determination that she 
had 'urgent, compelling and necessitous' reason to leave her employment in 
connection with her decision to remain with [her] partner, who was relocating his 
business, for purposes of determining employee's entitlement to unemployment 
benefits."265 
The plaintiff, a teacher in Norwell, declined an offer of reappointment for the 
following school year because her partner of thirteen years was relocating and she 
planned to go with him.266  After the move, she was unable to obtain a teaching 
position and applied for unemployment benefits.267  The Department of Employment 
and Training denied her claim because her decision to relocate with her partner did 
not constitute an "urgent, compelling and necessitous" reason.268  The board of 
review affirmed, and the plaintiff sought judicial review.269  The district court 
reversed the agency's decision, and this court transferred the case on its own motion 
and affirmed the district court judgment.270 
The court inferred from the broad language of the statute that the legislature 
intended to provide standards that were flexible enough to insure effective 
application of legislative policy in all circumstances, and that these standards cannot 
be applied with "mathematical precision."271  The court believed that it would be 
improper to create a rule where a nonmarried partner is denied an opportunity to 
show that his or her reasons for terminating employment were as "urgent, 
compelling, and necessitous" as those of a married person.272  In addition, the court 
believed that workable standards could be created for making such determinations.273  
It found the extra administrative burden did not justify the denial of benefits to 
persons "who can prove they acted reasonably, based on pressing circumstances, in 
leaving employment."274 
Rovira v. AT&T:  Denial of Death Benefits 
In Rovira v. AT&T, the court held that the partner of a deceased employee could 
not collect death benefits even though the company promised not to discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation.275  The employee and Rovira lived together for twelve 
years during which time the couple pooled financial resources, shared responsibility 
                                                                
265Reep, 593 N.E.2d at 1298. 
266Id.  See also Kirsten Hagedorn Frey, Employment Law-The Erosion of the Voluntary 
Quit Disqualification from Unemployment Compensation Benefits:  Reep v. Commissioner of 
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275Rovira v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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for decision making that affected their lives, owned a home together, and took 
vacations together.276  In addition, Rovira was listed as the beneficiary of the 
employee's life insurance policy, and, under the employee's will, was named 
executor of the estate.277 
After the employee's death, Rovira requested the "sickness-death benefit" for 
herself and her children under AT&T's benefit plan.278  This benefit provided one 
year's salary to the surviving spouse or unmarried children of an employee who died 
as a result of illness.279  Even though AT&T's personnel policies prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status, Rovira's request 
was denied because the women were not legally married, and the children were not 
the biological or adoptive children of the employee.280   
The court ruled that noncompliance with its discrimination policy was 
permissible because the policy did not appear in the benefit plan documents; 
therefore, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) would not require 
AT&T to comply with its promise.281 
Ross v. Denver Department of Health & Hospitals:  Denial of Family Sick Leave 
In Ross v. Denver Department of Health & Hospitals, the court held that the 
denial of sick leave benefits did not violate the rule prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination, and the classification system used in the rules did not violate the Due 
Process or Equal Protection clauses.282  Ross requested sick leave benefits to take 
care of her domestic partner.283  The Department of Health and Hospitals denied her 
request, because domestic partner did not meet the definition of "immediate family" 
as defined by the Career Service Authority Rules.284  She appealed the Department's 
decision.285 
A hearings officer found that the definition of "immediate family" discriminated 
against Ross on the basis of sexual orientation which violated the Career Service 
Authority's anti-discrimination rule and ordered the Department to grant her 
                                                                
276Id. at 1064; see also Green, supra note 263, at 410 (describing Rovira's and Forlini's 
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277Rovira, 817 F. Supp. at 1064. 
278Hargrove, supra note 63, at 51. 
279Id. 
280Id. 
281Id.  See also Frank C. Morris, Jr., Privacy and Defamation in Employment, 42 
ALI-ABA 201, 246 (Feb. 12, 1997); Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual 
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282Ross v. Denver Dep’t of Health and Hosps., 883 P.2d 516 (Co. Ct. App. 1994); see also 
Barbara A. Robb, The Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in the Wake of Romer 
v. Evans, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 263, 310 (1997) (discussion of Ross v. Denver Dep't of Health 
and Hosps). 
283Ross, 883 P.2d at 518. 
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request.286  The Department appealed this decision to the Board which reversed the 
hearings officer ruling.287  Ross sought judicial review in the district court which 
reversed the Board's decision and reinstated the hearing officer's order.288  The court 
of appeals found that the district court erred in ruling that the denial of Ross's sick 
leave violated the Career Service Authority Rule against discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.289 
The Career Service Authority defined "immediate family" as:  "[h]usband, wife, 
son, daughter, mother, father, grandmother, grandfather, brother, sister, son-in-law, 
daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, [and] sister in law."290  
Ross acknowledged that her partner did not fall within this definition but argued that 
this definition was superseded and invalidated by a subsequent rule which states:  
"[T]he following administrative actions relating to personnel matters shall be subject 
to appeal:  . . . . c) Discriminatory actions:  any action of any officer or employee 
resulting in alleged discrimination because of race, color, creed, national origin, sex, 
age, political affiliation, or sexual orientation."291  The court, however, disagreed 
with Ross's argument and concluded that the fact this rule was promulgated later than 
the rule which defined "immediate family did not mandate a conclusion that it had a 
superseding effect.292  The court pointed out that Ross cited no legislative history to 
support her argument.293 
The court found that homosexual employees, such as Ross, were not precluded 
from taking advantage of family sick leave benefits.  The employee may use such 
benefits to take care of any person fitting the definition of "immediate family."294  
The only portion of the definition that affected homosexuals differently is the 
language allowing the employee to use the benefit to care for a husband or wife; 
however, this portion did not differentiate between heterosexual and homosexual 
employees but rather between unmarried and married ones.295  Therefore, 
homosexual employees and unmarried, or similarly situated, heterosexual employees 
were not being treated differently.296 
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Ross further argued that the definition contained in the Authority's rules violated 
the Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees of the Colorado and United States 
Constitutions because it created a class of people denied benefits on the basis of their 
sexual orientation.297  The court disagreed with Ross's argument reiterating its point 
that Ross was not treated differently than other unmarried employees and ruled that 
she had not established a claim of denial of equal protection or due process.298 
Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers State University:  Denial of 
Health Benefits 
In Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers State University, employees 
and their union appealed a decision of the Division of Pension which denied health 
insurance coverage to the employees' same-sex domestic partners.299  After the 
plaintiffs' requests for health insurance coverage for their same-sex partners were 
denied, they filed a grievance against Rutgers alleging discrimination; however, their 
grievance was denied.300  The plaintiffs then filed a complaint with the Law Division 
against Rutgers and other defendants alleging discrimination and violations of the 
New Jersey Constitution.301  The case was transferred to the Appellate Division 
where the court found in favor of the University and the other defendants.302 
All of the plaintiffs were professors at the University.  Each had lived with their 
same-sex partner for over fourteen years, shared property and other financial 
obligations, and in one situation, raised a child together.303  The plaintiffs argued that 
the statutory term "dependent" should be read to include domestic partners who are 
the functional equivalent of spouses.304  They used the Law Against Discrimination 
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Programs 
The University of Iowa offers faculty, professional and scientific staff 
the ability to insure their same sex domestic partner under various benefit 
programs. These programs include health, dental, vision, hearing aid, and 
accidental death and dismemberment insurance. This document will 
explain how these programs work for individuals in this situation. The 
University does not contribute towards the cost of any benefit program for 
your domestic partner. It only allows your domestic partner the access to 
an insurance product.  
The University benefit program for its faculty and professional staff is 
considered a Section 125 flexible benefits program. The program is 
regulated by the I.R.S. and as a result, domestic partners are not permitted 
to participate in this program as a spousal equivalent. Instead, we offer 
your domestic partner the ability to carry their own insurance contract for 
each of the plans that are offered. Therefore, the flexible benefits 
enrollment materials that you as an employee receive each year will be for 
you. There is an exception to this general rule. The exception is if your 
domestic partner meets the Internal Revenue Service dependency 
guidelines, then your domestic partner may be included under the flexible 
benefits program. These dependency guidelines require that the domestic 
partner be totally dependent upon you for all living and income sources. If 
you feel that you meet this qualification, you must notify the Benefits 
Office in order to qualify for this special program. Otherwise, you and 
your partner will be considered separately for benefit purposes.  
In order to insure a domestic partner, you must register that individual 
with the University Benefits Office. This is done by completing the 
Affidavit for Domestic Partner form that is attached to this document. A 
second attached document explains the criteria required for this domestic 
partner relationship. You need only to complete this affidavit once and it 
will remain in effect until such time as the relationship ends. It is your 
responsibility to notify the Benefits Office if a domestic partner 
relationship ends. A new affidavit would then have to be filed if another 
relationship comes into existence in the future.  
Once you have registered with the University Benefits Office, you will 
receive a special insurance application form which must be completed by 
your partner. On this application form, your partner will designate the 
particular benefits in which they wish to participate. These benefit 
programs do not have to be the same benefit programs in which you are 
participating. There will be no medical questionnaire or pre-existing 
condition clauses involved in the coverage for your domestic partner. The 
effective date of the coverage will be assigned by the Benefits Office. It is 
generally the first of the month following the receipt of the completed 
application form.  
When the completed insurance application has been received by the 
University Benefits Office, your domestic partner will receive their own 
identification cards for the /dental insurance plans that they have selected. 
All claims will be filed by your partner under their own social security 
number. As far as any provider or insurance company is concerned, the 
domestic partner is an employee at The University of Iowa for insurance 
purposes. The domestic partner will receive all appropriate mailings and 
handouts concerning the selected insurance product.  
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Children of either you or your domestic partner may be insured under 
any of the benefit programs. If the children are your legal responsibility 
and you have the financial responsibility for them for health insurance, 
you will be given additional contributions from the University towards the 
cost of insuring these dependents. If this is the situation, you must supply 
the Benefits Office with the appropriate paperwork such as birth 
certificates, adoption paperwork, or divorce decrees in order to prove this 
financial relationship. If the dependent children are your domestic 
partner's, then there is no contribution for these individuals, but they may 
be included under your domestic partner's insurance plan. They cannot be 
included under your plans since they have no legal or financial ties to you. 
If there is a joint adoption relationship, then the dependent children may 
be included under your plans and you will also receive additional 
contributions from the University towards these costs.  
The cost associated with the particular benefits that your domestic 
partner selects will be deducted from your paycheck on a monthly basis. 
These deductions will occur on an after-tax basis. Current Internal 
Revenue Service rules do not permit domestic partner benefits to be paid 
for with pre-tax money.  
Federal and state COBRA regulations apply to your domestic partner. 
This means that if you or your domestic partner's insurance is canceled as 
a result of termination of employment, ending of the domestic partner 
relationship, or a child no longer qualifying as a dependent, the individual 
who loses the coverage will be eligible to continue the insurance on a 
voluntary basis for a period of time from 18 to 36 months, depending upon 
the reason for the loss of coverage. If and when an event such as this 
happens, the Benefits Office will notify the individuals involved of their 
particular rights under this legislation.  
The issue of benefits for your domestic partner is complex. If you 
have additional questions, please feel free to contact the Benefits Office 
directly at 335-2676. As a note, all information supplied by you and your 
domestic partner is kept confidential and this information is not released to 
the insurance carrier or any party outside of the Benefits and Payroll 
departments which are involved in the processing of the enrollments and 
deductions.  
Domestic Partners Eligibility  
A qualified domestic partner, as defined below, is eligible to apply for 
coverage under The University of Iowa Health, Dental, Vision, and 
Hearing Aid Insurance plans.  
To be eligible for coverage as a Domestic Partner, the University 
employee and the Domestic Partner must complete and file with the Staff 
Benefits Office an "Affidavit of Domestic Partnership" in which they 
attest that (a) are each other's sole domestic partner, responsible for each 
other's common welfare, (b) domestic partner must not be able to qualify 
for coverage as a common law spouse, (c) party is married, (d) partners 
are not related by blood closer than would bar marriage in the State of 
Iowa, (e) partner is at least 18 years of age and of the same sex, and (f) 
three of the following conditions exist for the partners:  
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(LAD) to further support their argument.  Because LAD prohibited discrimination 
against an employee based on marital status and sexual orientation, they argued that 
it would be a violation of LAD to deny them coverage.305  However, the court 
rejected this argument pointing out that LAD excepted from its provisions benefit 
and insurance programs.306 
                                                          
1. The partners have been residing together for at least twelve (12) 
months prior to filing the Affidavit of Domestic Partnership. 
2. The partners have common or joint ownership of a residence 
(home, condominium, or mobile home). 
3. The partners have at least two of the following arrangements: 
a.  joint ownership of a motor vehicle; b.  a joint credit account; 
c.  a joint checking account; or d.  a lease for a residence identifying both 
domestic partners as tenants  
4. The Domestic Partner (a) been designated as a beneficiary of the 
employee's University of Iowa Group Life Insurance coverage, or (b) been 
designated as a beneficiary for the death benefit payable from the 
employee's retirement annuity contract, or (c) University employee 
declares that the Domestic Partner is identified as a primary beneficiary in 
the employee's will. 
5. The Domestic Partners have executed a "relationship contract," 
which (a) each of the parties to provide support for the other party and (b) 
provides, in the event of the termination of the domestic partnership, for a 
substantially equal division for any property acquired during the 
relationship.  
Additional Provisions  
1. Notification of Changes. The parties must agree to notify the 
Benefits office of any change in the circumstances which have been 
attested to in the documents qualifying a person for coverage as a 
Domestic Partner.  
2.  Liability for False Statements. If any company or the University 
suffers a loss because of a false statement contained in the documents 
submitted in connection with coverage for a Domestic Partner or as a 
consequence of the failure to notify the Benefits Office of a changed 
circumstance, the company or the University will be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney fees in addition to damages for all such losses.  
3.  Termination. Either member of a domestic partnership may file 
a statement with the Benefits Office indicating the relationship has ended. 
A copy of the termination will be mailed to the other partner unless both 
have signed the termination statement.  
4.  Waiting Period. Following the termination of a Domestic 
Partnership, a twelve-month period must elapse before a University 
employee is eligible to designate a new Domestic Partner.). 
305Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters, 689 A.2d at 831. 
306Id. at 832. 
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As to the plaintiffs' Constitutional claims, the court found no discriminatory 
intent behind the marital status classification.307  The court cited several cases where 
federal courts have held that sexual orientation classifications are not suspect.308  The 
court concluded that if the federal court refused to find the classification suspect, 
then it would not do so either, and, therefore, there was no reason to view marital 
status or sexual orientation as deserving of heightened scrutiny.309  Instead, the 
analysis turns on whether there was a "real and substantial relationship" between the 
differential treatment and the State's interest in the classification.310 
The court concluded that the state's interest should prevail.  The importance of 
affordable health insurance and the State's interest in objective determinations of 
eligibility avoids a subjective analysis that would cause certain conflict in 
establishing criteria.311  Therefore, the plaintiffs' due process and equal protection 
arguments were denied.312 
University of Alaska v. Tumeo:  Health Insurance Benefits Allowed 
In University of Alaska v. Tumeo, two employees of the University were denied 
insurance benefits for their domestic partners, and they filed suit.313  The Superior 
Court of Alaska found in favor of the employees314 and the Supreme Court of Alaska 
affirmed.315 
Both employees were unmarried and involved in a same-sex relationship.316  The 
University denied the employees' requests for domestic partner benefits on the basis 
that its "health care plan does not allow for coverage of a domestic partner, nor is 
there any obligation under the plan to provide for such coverage."317  After the 
University's denial of the employees' grievances, the plaintiffs appealed to the 
superior court arguing that the University's health insurance program discriminates 
on the basis of marital status in violation of the Alaska Constitution.318 
The superior court held that "[t]he University, by providing added health care 
coverage for married employees but not for unmarried employees, is compensating 
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318 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 13:281 
married employees to a greater extent than it compensates unmarried employees" 
and that "using marital status as a classification for determining which of its 
employees will receive additional compensation in the form of third-party health 
coverage ... violates state laws prohibiting marital status discrimination."319  Further, 
the court concluded that the definition of "dependent" that the University used was 
unlawful.320 
The University admitted that it discriminated against the employees based on 
their marital status by "paying them less compensation than it pays other similarly-
situated employees."321  However, they argue that this discrimination did not violate 
the Human Rights Act, because the legislature did not intend to prohibit such 
discrimination.322  The Supreme Court of Alaska disagreed with this argument and 
held "[t]he clear and unambiguous language of the Human Rights Act forbids 
discrimination in employment on the basis of marital status."323  As the superior court 
noted, "to allow this basis for disparate treatment would be to eliminate the 
prohibition against marital status discrimination.  Any employer could raise the 
argument with respect to any item of employee compensation."324 
D.  Equal Protection 
As noted earlier in the introduction, employers that do offer domestic partner 
benefits do not always extend these benefits to both homosexual and heterosexual 
unmarried partners.  Some employers offer these benefits to homosexual couples 
only.  These employers believe that heterosexual couples have the option of 
marriage, whereas, gay and lesbian couples do not.325  Depending on state law and 
whether the government is the employer, this reasoning leaves open the possibility of 
an equal protection challenge. 
An unmarried heterosexual couple, who has been denied benefits where benefits 
are offered to homosexual couples, may attempt to argue an equal protection 
violation based on gender discrimination.  The argument may be based on the fact 
that both the opposite- and same-sex couple are unmarried, and the only reason for 
the denial of benefits to the opposite-sex couple is the fact that one of the partners in 
the relationship is of a different gender than the other.  If such an argument could be 
made successfully, the court may use an intermediate standard of review when 
                                                                
319Id.  See also Tumeo, 1995 WL 238359, at *6, *8. 
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making its decision.  Intermediate analysis is generally associated with cases 
involving gender discrimination.326 
The intermediate standard of review is not as difficult for the government to meet 
as the strict scrutiny standard of review which requires a compelling state interest in 
order for the government to prevail.327  In addition, the intermediate standard 
involves far less deference to the legislature as does the rational basis test.328  Under 
the intermediate standard, a classification will not be upheld unless it is found that 
such classification has a "substantial relationship" to an "important" government 
interest.329 
Therefore, when arguing gender discrimination based on the fact you are an 
unmarried heterosexual couple as opposed to a homosexual couple, it must be shown 
that the law or policy is not substantially related to an important governmental 
interest.  The government may argue that they have an important interest in the 
preservation of marriage and the maintenance of family; however, they may be 
contradicting this argument by offering privileges to some unmarried couples—
homosexuals—while excluding non-married heterosexual couples. 
Another way a non-married heterosexual couple may bring an equal protection 
challenge is by alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  In 1997, in 
the City of Milwaukee, the City Attorney's office issued a legal opinion which stated 
that any domestic partner benefit proposal must include heterosexuals as well as 
homosexuals.330  According to the opinion, failure to include heterosexuals would 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.331  In addition, the City of Oakland 
may face a court challenge to its domestic partner law based on sexual orientation 
discrimination because it extends benefits to homosexual couples and not unmarried 
heterosexual couples.332  If such a challenge prevails, other employers offering 
domestic partner benefits to same-sex couples only may face similar challenges. 
Although some have argued for strict scrutiny review in sexual orientation 
discrimination cases, the basis of review is likely to be rational basis review.333  
Under the rational basis test, "the classification only has to have a rational 
relationship to any legitimate governmental interest in order to comply with the 
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equal protection guarantee."334  The court will uphold a classification under this 
standard "unless no reasonably conceivable set of facts could establish a rational 
relationship between the classification and an arguably legitimate end of 
government."335 
The employee will have to prove that the law or policy has no rational 
relationship to a legitimate end of government.  The government or employer may 
argue that the preservation of marriage and family is a legitimate end and that not 
extending benefits to unmarried heterosexual couples is rationally related to that 
purpose.  However, as noted earlier, the government or employer may be 
contradicting themselves because they are offering benefits to some married 
employees but not to others.  The employee may argue that his or her sexual 
orientation—heterosexual—is the only basis for denial of such benefits. 
The employer or government may be able to argue that unmarried heterosexuals 
and homosexuals are not similarly situated because heterosexual couples have the 
option to marry while homosexual couples do not.336  However, marriage may not be 
the best option for all heterosexual partners in need of insurance benefits.  Although 
a non-married couple may be as committed to one another as that of a married 
couple, religious beliefs or financial reasons, such as loss of government benefits, 
may preclude such a couple from marrying. 
In addition, the government may attempt to argue that married couples and 
homosexual couples are similarly situated in every way except that which is 
prohibited to them.337  However, it is difficult to determine whether such an argument 
will prevail.  In cases such as Hinman, discussed supra, the court ruled that 
homosexuals were not similarly situated to married couples.338  However, other 
courts such as that in University of Alaska, discussed supra, found that such 
distinction constituted marital status discrimination.339 
E.  Alternative 
Employers can avoid liability all together by simply eliminating all family 
coverage.340  Under that scenario, there are no issues regarding discrimination or 
equal pay because all employees' partners or spouses receive the same coverage 
which happens to be none.341  However, this puts employees with families at risk of 
financial disaster should a family member become seriously ill.342  In addition, 
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employers opting not to provide family coverage will likely have trouble attracting 
and retaining top employees.343 
IV.  THE PRESENT SITUATION 
In late 1997, Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts introduced a bill 
which would make domestic partners of federal employees eligible for health 
insurance coverage through the federal employee health program.  These employees 
would also be eligible for lifetime survivor benefits under the federal pension, life 
insurance, and workers' compensation programs.344  Frank said it was time for the 
federal government to "recognize that people who live in committed relationships, 
regardless of their sexual orientation or marital status, ought to be eligible for the 
same basic set of benefits, including health care coverage, life insurance, health 
insurance and compensation for work injuries."345  Under the bill, labeled Domestic 
Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act of 1997, the extended health and retirement 
coverage would go to the following: 
*Same- or opposite-sex couples (if one of them worked for the 
government or postal service) who are "living together, in a committed, 
intimate relationship." 
*Couples who are responsible for each other's welfare and financial 
obligations.346 
Couples would have to submit an affidavit of eligibility for benefits to the Office 
of Personnel Management.  This affidavit would certify that the couple lived together 
in a committed domestic relationship.347 
Also in 1997, lawyers for the New York City Council were asked to draft a 
domestic partner ordinance similar to one San Francisco adopted.348  Councilman 
Tom Duane, the bill's backer, wants it to be modeled after the San Francisco 
ordinance which requires city contractors to offer the same benefits to domestic 
partners that are extended to spouses.349  The proposal differs from San Francisco's 
ordinance in that San Francisco requires the couple to register with the city, whereas, 
New York City's proposal would permit all employees, whether registered or not, to 
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apply for coverage.350  However, the proposal would require employees to provide 
some proof of their partner status to employers.351 
It should be noted that if same-sex marriages become legal, then homosexuals 
who do marry will likely receive the same benefits legally married couples currently 
receive.352  This diminishes the need for domestic partnerships of same-sex couples.  
Should this happen, unmarried heterosexuals who are challenging laws and policies 
that offer benefits to same-sex partners may find that their argument of being 
"similarly situated" does not have the same impact as it did before.  It would then be 
an argument of "unmarried" versus "married" employees.  There would be no group 
of employees, other than blood relatives and others such as minors, that would not be 
allowed by the state to legally marry.  The equal protection argument for unmarried 
heterosexuals would not have the same "bite" as it did prior to the legalization of 
same-sex marriages. 
The federal government, however, has recently passed the Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA), which may severely limit the number of states recognizing same-sex 
marriages.  DOMA allows states to choose not to recognize same-sex marriages that 
were performed in other states.353 Several states have enacted legislation prohibiting 
the recognition of such marriages.354 However, if a state does lift the ban on same-
sex marriages, DOMA will likely face constitutional challenges under both the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.355 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The traditional concept of family is changing in the face of judicial and 
legislative recognition of a broader definition of family.  Because of this change in 
the family structure, domestic partnerships have developed.  These arrangements 
offer an alternative to marriage for both same- and opposite-sex couples who either 
cannot marry or choose not to marry due to religious reasons or other consequences. 
As case law indicates, there is no consistency of judicial review in the area of 
domestic partnerships.  However, given the number of private and public employers 
currently offering such benefits, it appears that domestic partnerships are becoming 
the norm in our society.  In addition, as governments and private employers vow not 
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to discriminate based on marital status and sexual orientation, court challenges may 
arise if these employers do not extend the same benefits to their unmarried 
employees as they do to their married employees. 
Although many employers currently offer domestic partner benefits to the same-
sex partners of their employees, some of these employers choose not to offer such 
benefits to opposite-sex partners of unmarried employees.  This may open the door 
for a discrimination or equal protection challenge.  Employers argue that the 
differential treatment between unmarried opposite-sex and same-sex couples is 
warranted, because same-sex couples do not have the option to marry.  However, 
there may be compelling reasons why opposite-sex couples cannot marry, therefore, 
defeating that argument. 
In order to avoid preemption, domestic partnership legislation should be enacted 
at the state level.  Such legislation allows social and legal recognition of these non-
traditional unions and confers benefits without designating the relationship as a 
marriage.356  This approach may be less oppressive to unmarried, but committed 
couples.357 
Although great strides have been made in the area of domestic partnership, not all 
employers or jurisdictions recognize a need to confer such benefits.  If employees 
with non-traditional families want their employers to offer such benefits, they must 
continue to lobby for these benefits by pointing out the unfairness and inequities in 
not offering such benefits.358  As employees become more aware of compensation 
differentials based upon marital status, there will likely be more of a push on 
employers by their employees to offer such benefits.359  In addition, ordinances such 
as the one San Francisco enacted may force employers to offer these benefits 
whether they want to or not.360 
Most employees rely on employment benefits for themselves and their families.  
These benefits are considered part of an employee's compensation package and 
provide financial and emotional support in the area of health care and retirement.361  
No matter where you look in our society, benefits and protections are being offered 
to married couples that are not available to unmarried couples.362  As employers 
begin to recognize that offering benefits to non-traditional families of their 
employees  can  be  achieved  at  minimal  cost,  they  may  e more willing to extend 
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these benefits.363  These employers will be able to attract and keep good employees 
by offering benefits their competitors do not. 
DEBBIE ZIELINSKI 
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